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Abstract
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11 Introduction
The phenomenon of so-called oﬀshoring to low-wage countries has recently generated a
great deal of attention. In the US and Western Europe, media has been ﬁlled with reports
about how ﬁrms move parts of their production or outsource to suppliers in China, India,
and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The activities concerned do not appear
to be limited to labor-intensive manufacturing but also extend to skill-intensive services
such as computer programming. This development has generated new worries about the
consequences of globalization, i.e. worries about losing high-wage jobs rather than low-
wage jobs.
In this paper, this issue is addressed by studying labor demand eﬀects of oﬀshoring.
By oﬀshoring we mean a shift from domestic to foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs
and services. Using this deﬁnition, we include both international outsourcing proper, that
is, situations where the ﬁrm decides to purchase inputs from independent foreign suppliers
instead of producing them itself, and a relocation of the ﬁrm’s own activities, so-called in-
house oﬀshoring. Thus, we focus on the location of intermediate input production rather
than on the way these activities are organized, i.e. whether they take place in-house or are
outsourced to other ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst systematic analyses of the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the demand for skilled and
unskilled labor were carried out by Feenstra and Hanson in the 1990s (Feenstra and Han-
son, 1996, 1999). They developed a methodology for estimating the eﬀect of imported
intermediate purchases on the relative wages of production versus non-production work-
ers. Basically, the idea behind the methodology is to assess to what extent domestic work-
ers have been substituted for workers abroad through increasing imports of intermediate
goods. In the latter study (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999), they found that oﬀshoring could
account for about 15 percent of the observed increase in the relative wage of non-production
workers in the US during the 1979-1990 period. A number of subsequent studies have used
a similar methodology to study the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on labor demand (Falk and Koebel
2002, Strauss-Kahn 2004, Amiti and Wei 2005a, 2005b and Hijzen, Görg and Hine 2005).
As Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Strauss-Kahn (2004), dealing with France, and Amiti
2and Wei (2005a, 2005b), dealing with the United Kingdom and the United States, lack
direct information about imported inputs, but use information on import penetration in
conjunction with information about input-output coeﬃcients to construct proxies.1 Falk
and Koebel (2002) and Hijzen et al. (2005) have direct information on imported inputs
and are also able to measure skills more precisely. Falk and Koebel (2002), dealing with
Germany 1978-1990, ﬁnd no evidence of labor with the lowest educational attainment be-
ing substituted for either imported materials or purchased services. Hijzen et al.(2005),
on the other hand, dealing with the United Kingdom 1982-1996, ﬁnd that oﬀshoring had
a strong negative impact on workers in occupations considered to be low-skilled.
With the exception of the study by Strauss-Kahn (2004), neither of these studies
distinguishes between oﬀshoring to low-income and high-income countries; a distinction
that is likely to be important for the eﬀect on the relative demand for skills.2 Most imports
of inputs to high-income countries probably stem from other high-income countries, since
this is what the overall trade pattern looks like. This type of oﬀshoring may not have
any particular impact on the relative demand for skills since the oﬀshored activities are
likely to have similar factor intensities as the remaining activities. On the other hand,
oﬀshoring to low-income countries seems to have increased lately. To the extent that
activities oﬀshored to low-income countries have diﬀerent skill-intensities than remaining
activities, we would expect this development to lead to changes in the relative demand for
skills.
In this paper, we use data for Sweden 1995-2000 to estimate the impact of oﬀshoring
on the relative demand for labor with diﬀerent levels of educational attainment. As in
1Amiti and Wei (2005a, 2005b) study the eﬀect on the overall labor demand rather than the relative
demand for skilled and unskilled labor. Strauss-Kahn (2003) ﬁnds evidence of a negative impact of
oﬀshoring on the demand for non-production workers in France.
2That the source of imports is important for the eﬀect of import penetration on the relative demand
for production and non-production workers has been shown by e.g. Anderton and Brenton (1999) and
Hansson (2000). Anderton and Brenton (1999) found that import penetration from low-income countries
explained up to 40 percent of the observed increase in the cost share of skilled workers in textile industries
in the United Kingdom, but not in the mechanical engineering industries. Import penetration from high-
wage countries had no statistically signiﬁcant impact in either industry. Hansson (2000) found that import
penetration from non-OECD countries contributed to a decrease in the relative demand for skilled workers
measured as workers with post secondary education in Sweden, although quantitatively the eﬀect seem
rather small.
3Falk and Koebel (2002) and Hijzen et al. (2005) we use direct information on imported
inputs from the input-output tables. We combine this information with information from
the trade statistics to construct proxies of oﬀs h o r i n gt od i ﬀerent groups of countries. We
distinguish between high-income and low-income countries as well as between countries
b e l o n g i n gt od i ﬀerent regions. Our analysis is closest to that of Hijzen et al.(2005) in that
it uses a translog cost function approach to estimate the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the relative
demand for skill groups. However, we use information about educational attainment rather
than occupational classiﬁcation to allocate employees into diﬀerent skill groups.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we explain
how we measure oﬀshoring and show descriptive evidence on the development of diﬀerent
measures of oﬀshoring. We then proceed to presenting the econometric analysis in section
3 and the results in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2M e a s u r i n g O ﬀshoring
Our measure of oﬀshoring is based on information about imported inputs from the input-
output tables and it captures both international outsourcing proper, that is, situations
where the ﬁrm decides to purchase inputs from independent foreign suppliers instead of
producing them itself, and a relocation of the ﬁrm’s own intermediate input production, so-
called in-house oﬀshoring or vertical foreign direct investment. Following the terminology
used by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), we distinguish between narrow and broad oﬀshoring.
Narrow oﬀshoring only includes imported intermediate inputs from the importing industry,
i.e. an industry’s purchases of imported intermediate inputs produced in the same industry.
Broad oﬀshoring also includes imported non-energy intermediate inputs from all other
industries. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) prefer the narrow to the broad measure, since
it is closer to the phenomenon of fragmentation and vertical specialization that takes
place within industries. For instance, in the car industry, imports of steel would not
normally be considered to stem from oﬀshoring, but the purchase of automobile parts
would, particularly if the parts were formerly manufactured by the importing company.
Moreover, a shift from a domestic to a foreign steel supplier would not aﬀect the workers in
4the automobile industry but those in the steel industry. The rationale for using the broad
measure is that the industry classiﬁcation may be too narrow in the sense of classifying
production processes formerly made within a ﬁrm into another industry when outsourced
to a sub-contractor.
Both the narrow and the broad measures of oﬀshoring are deﬁned as imported inter-














where mij is industry i’s use of imported intermediate inputs from industry j and Yi is
production.
Direct information about industry use of imported intermediates through input-output
tables is only available for 1995 and 2000; the years for which detailed input-output tables
have been constructed. However, by extrapolating information from these input-output
tables, we can construct time series for oﬀshoring. Constructing a time series for the
narrow measure, we start from the observation that (1) can be rewritten as the product










where Mi is total imports in industry i. We observe the share of intermediate inputs in
total imports in industry i, mii/Mi, in 1995 and 2000, while we observe imports in relation
to domestic output every year during the period studied. To obtain imputed values of zN
i
for 1996-1999, we use a linear interpolation of mii/Mi based on the 1995 and 2000 values.
Constructing a time series for the broad measure, we proceed along similar lines. We











We observe industry i’s use of intermediate inputs in industry j as a share of total
imports in industry j, mij/Mj, in 1995 and 2000 and the relation between imports in
industry j and output in industry i every year during the period studied. To calculate
values of zB
i for 1996-1999, we now interpolate mij/Mj based on the 1995 and 2000 values.
This procedure is based on the assumption that the relationship between an industry’s use
of imported inputs from its own and other industries and total imports in these industries
change slowly and trendwise.
I nT a b l e1 ,w es h o wh o wd i ﬀerent measures of oﬀshoring changed between 1995 and
2000. We use both the narrow and the broad deﬁnition of oﬀshoring, i.e., a deﬁnition
based on an industry’s imported inputs from the industry itself (narrow) and a deﬁnition
based on an industry’s imported inputs from all industries (broad). These measures are
put both in relation to the industry’s total use of inputs (from the industry itself in the
narrow measure and from all industries in the broad measure), as well as in relation to the
industry’s output. All of these measures indicate that oﬀshoring increased between 1995
and 2000. The share of imported inputs in total inputs increased by 4-7 percentage points
in manufacturing. The imports of services account for the largest percentage increases both
in manufacturing (31 percent) and in the service sector (25-30 percent). The increase in
imports of intermediate goods is, however, much more important than the increase in
service imports in absolute terms.
We construct proxies of oﬀshoring to diﬀerent country groups by assuming that the
country distribution of imports in industry i i st h es a m ef o ri n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t sa sf o r
ﬁnal products. Whereas this assumption is unlikely to hold in a strict sense, there is no
obvious reason for these country distributions to diﬀer in a systematic way. On average,
intermediate inputs make up about 40 percent of overall imports in Sweden, implying
that the weight of the country distribution of intermediates in the distribution for overall
i m p o r t si sa b o u t0 . 4 . 3
3Imports of intermediate inputs excluding crude oil and petroleum products make up 37 percent of
6Table 1. Oﬀshoring in 1995 and 2000, imported inputs as a percentage share of output
and inputs.
Measure 1995 2000 Change
(perc. points) (percent)
Share in output
All industries Narrow 4.0 4.2 0.2 5.0
Broad 8.8 9.6 0.8 9.1
Manufacturing Narrow 9.1 9.8 0.7 7.7
Broad 22.1 25.9 3.8 17.2
Services Narrow 1.0 1.3 0.3 30.0
Broad 6.7 8.4 1.7 25.4
Services within manuf. 10.0 13.1 3.1 31.0
Share in inputs
All industries Narrow 37.3 39.1 1.8 4.8
Broad 17.6 19.1 1.5 8.5
Manufacturing Narrow 46.7 53.3 6.6 14.4
Broad 33.6 38.1 4.5 13.4
Services Narrow 16.3 16.8 0.5 3.1
Broad 16.5 19.1 2.6 15.8
Note: The narrow measure consists of imported inputs within the industry whereas the broad
measure consists of imported inputs from all industries. Source: Input-output tables collected by
Statistics Sweden.
Figure 1 shows narrow oﬀshoring to diﬀerent regions in 1995 and 2000. It is clear from
this ﬁgure that the main part of narrow oﬀshoring takes place in Western Europe, but that
it is oﬀshoring to Asia and, in particular, Central and Eastern Europe that has increased
over time. It should be noted that price changes and exchange rates may have an impact
on import-based measures. For example, a shift of intermediate goods production from
Western Europe to low-income countries in Asia may have been larger than indicated by
the import statistics. Lower production costs imply that similar goods can be imported at
lower prices from Asia than from Western Europe, leading to an underestimation of any
total imports in 2000. Information about the share of intermediate inputs in trade is available on the web
site of the National Institute of Economic Research in Stockholm (see www.konj.se).
7shift in production.
Figures 2 and 3 show the development of oﬀs h o r i n gt oh i g h - i n c o m ea n dl o w - i n c o m e
countries, respectively, for six broad industry groups.4 Oﬀshoring to high-income countries
has decreased in the transport and textile industries and has not increased distinctly in any
of the other industries. Oﬀshoring to low-income countries has also decreased in the textile
sector, whereas there has been an increase in the transport sector (very large in percentage
terms but relatively small in absolute values). This suggests that some of the purchases of
intermediate inputs in the transport sector have shifted from high-income to low-income
countries. The most eye-catching development, however, is the quadrupling of oﬀshoring to
low-income countries in electrical machinery since 1995. The largest increase (389 percent
between 1995 and 2002) has taken place in the sector containing manufacturing of cell
phones (SNI 32, which consists of manufacturing of radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus).
Our measure of oﬀshoring excludes the situations where the ﬁnal stages of production
or the production of intermediate inputs intended for use in third-country export produc-
tion by foreign aﬃliates of multinational ﬁrms are oﬀshored abroad. For a country such as
Sweden, oﬀshoring of the ﬁnal stages of production may be particularly important since
multinationals constitute an important part of total production, while the Swedish mar-
ket for ﬁnal goods is rather small. According to the data for Swedish multinational ﬁrms
collected by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (Industriens Utredningsinsti-
tut), the largest part of aﬃliate sales of Swedish multinational ﬁrms in 1998 was sales in
the local market (64 percent of total sales), while the smallest category was sales back to
Sweden (11 percent of total sales).5 The remaining quarter of aﬃliate sales was exports
to third countries.
Hansson (2004, 2005) examines the eﬀect of a transfer of production within multina-
4High-income and low-income country groups are deﬁned according to World Bank classiﬁcation (World
Development Indicators). Industry groups are deﬁned as Textiles (SNI 17-19), Wood and Paper (SNI 20-
22), Metal and Machinery (SNI 27-29) Electric Machinery (SNI 30-33) Transport (SNI 34-35) and Other
(SNI 24-26, 36).
5The situation is similar for aﬃliate sales from US MNEs. Local sales are somewhat less important,
accounting for 56 percent of the total sales. Exports back to the US account for 16 percent, while 28
percent are exports to other countries in 1998 (computed from BEA statistics).
8tional ﬁrms on relative demand for unskilled workers, deﬁning unskilled workers as workers
with less than tertiary education. He ﬁnds that an expansion into non-OECD countries
has a negative eﬀect. We introduce a similar measure in some of the regressions below.
3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
In the econometric analysis, we model the impact of oﬀshoring on labor demand in a
similar way as has previously been done for factor-biased technological change (FBTC).
The underlying assumption is that technological change as well as oﬀshoring will aﬀect
productivity, but not necessarily in a uniform way across all factor inputs. For instance,
the introduction of new computer-based technologies will increase the productivity of labor
with computer skills, but may leave the productivity of other types of labor unaﬀected.
Such technological development may lead to increased relative demand for skilled versus
unskilled labor. In a similar manner, cost-reducing oﬀshoring will increase productivity
in the sense of increasing the net revenue per unit of factor input. However, when labor
intensive assembly activities are being oﬀshored, the productivity of workers involved in
headquarters activities and intermediate input production is likely to increase, whereas
the productivity of domestic assembly workers is unaﬀected. As with FBTC, this might
lead to a reduction in the relative demand for assembly workers.
We carry out the analysis based on a translog cost function, ﬁrst introduced in the
context of trade and demand for skills by Berman et al. (1994) and used in the literature by
e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Gieshecker (2002), Strauss- Kahn (2004) and Hijzen et al.
(2005). Following Gieshecker (2002) and Hijzen et al (2005), we treat oﬀshoring as a factor
that changes the technology with which the domestic industry operates and thus, this
potentially aﬀects the demand for various domestic factors of production. To control for
any FBTC induced by domestic innovation, we also include the industry’s R&D intensity.
We assume ﬁrms to be price takers in the factor markets. Industry i, i =1 ,...I produces an
output using diﬀerent types of labor, capital and intermediate inputs. Intermediate inputs
9are either sourced domestically or from abroad. By diﬀerentiating such a cost function
and applying Shephard’s lemma, we can express the cost share of factors as a function of
factor prices, output levels and technical change (see the appendix).
Under a common short-run translog cost function, where capital is considered to be a
quasi-ﬁxed factor, industry i’s cost share of labor belonging to skill group j is given by
θij = αj +
S X
s=1




(j =1 ,...S,s=1 ,...S,r=1 ,...R),
where θij ≡ wjLij/
S X
s=1
wsLis, Kj is the capital stock, Qi is value added, and zir variables
capturing factor-biased technical change in the industry.
The value of parameters γjs will depend on whether diﬀerent types of labor tend to
be substitutes for or complements to one another, while the value of δj will depend on
whether capital tends to substitute or complement labor belonging to skill group j.T h e
values of parameters λjr depend on whether technical change is biased towards or away
from the usage of labor belonging to skill group j.
In the main part of the analysis, we distinguish between three diﬀerent skill groups
based on educational attainment: workers with at most lower secondary, upper secondary,
and tertiary education.6 This results in a system of three equations such as (5); one
for each skill group. Homogeneity in prices implies
PS
s=1 γjs =0and symmetry of the
underlying translog cost function that γst = γts; restrictions imposed in the analysis.
As noted above, we consider mainly two measures of FBTC: oﬀshoring (denoted zh
i1,





where Ri is total expenditures on R&D and Yi is total output in industry i.W e a l s o
consider a measure of inhouse oﬀshoring, i.e. transfer of production within multinationals:
6Lower secondary education corresponds to 9 years of schooling while upper secondary education








iF is the number of employees in foreign aﬃliates of multinationals in industry
i and LM
iS the number of employees at the Swedish parents belonging to industry i.7
Employment is here used as a proxy for sales since sales ﬁgures are unavailable at a
disaggregated industry level. Our main measures of oﬀshoring capture in-house oﬀshoring
to the extent it concerns a relocation of the ﬁrm’s own intermediate input that is imported
back to Sweden for further processing. Thus, the oﬀshoring measures (1) and (2) may be
overlapping with the inhouse oﬀshoring measure (7). However, correlation between the
two types of measures is low.
Only two of the three cost share equations are independent, since the third cost share
is one minus the sum of the other two. (Note that
PS
j=1 θij =1implies that parameters
γjs, φj, δj,a n dλjr sum to zero across the S equations.) Therefore, we only estimate
two equations. To take a possible correlation between the residuals of the two equations
into account, we estimate the system using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). More
speciﬁcally, we use iterated SUR (ISUR) to ensure that estimates are independent of the
choice of which equation to exclude. Concavity of the cost function in wages requires that
labor demand elasticities on the diagonal be negative.
3.2 Data
Our information about employees and wages stems from a database called RAMS (Regional
Arbetsmarknadsstatistik). Industry and country distributed trade data for 1993—2002,
collected by Statistics Sweden, are available. Input-output tables containing information
about imports, however, are only available for 1995 and 2000 (through Statistics Sweden).
This information is combined to create time series of imports of intermediate inputs at
the country-industry level.
7This measure is somewhat diﬀerent from that used by Hansson (2001, 2004) in that we use the ratio
between aﬃliate and parent employees rather than the share of aﬃliate employees in total employment.
The reason for our using the ratio between foreign and home employment is that, for a particular region,
this measure is independent of the ﬁrms’ employment in other regions.
11Industry-distributed data on output, capital stocks and R&D expenditures have been
provided by Statistics Sweden as well. Industry-distributed information about employment
a tS w e d i s hm u l t i n a t i o n a l sh a v eb e e np r o v i d e db yt h eS w e d i s hI n s t i t u t ef o rG r o w t hP o l i c y
Studies (ITPS), Stockholm. More detailed information about the data used can be found
in one of the appendices.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Main analysis
In addition to total oﬀshoring, we use oﬀshoring measures distinguishing between imports
from low-income and high-income countries. Due to diﬀerences in the labor-content of
imported intermediate goods, the two oﬀshoring measures are expected to have diﬀerent
eﬀects on relative labor demand. We carry out two sets of estimations: (1) one where we
assume wages to be set economy-wide and (2) one where we allow them to diﬀer across
industries. With economy-wide wages, we get a set of three wages for each year, which
will be linearly dependent on time dummies if we include such dummies. Thus, we have
a choice of estimating the system with either wages or time dummies. Since we believe
time dummies to be important for capturing a trendwise increase in the cost share of
workers with tertiary education and a trendwise decrease in the cost share of workers with
lower secondary education, we choose the latter. Speciﬁcation (2) allows us to include
wages in the estimation and thereby obtain an estimate of wage elasticities. However, this
speciﬁcation suﬀers from a potential endogeneity problem; industry wages may be aﬀected
b yt h ei n d u s t r y ’ sw a g ec o s ts h a r e sf o rd i ﬀerent workers.
Our statistical inference is based on bootstrapped standard errors, i.e. standard errors
based on the distribution of estimates from repeated regressions on samples created by
resampling from the data. The reason for choosing this method is that the only available
analytically derived standard errors are based on the assumption of normally distributed
errors; an assumption which is violated in this case.8
8Our standard errors are based on 1,000 bootstrap replications, using the same sample size as the
12We start by presenting the results for the narrow measure of oﬀshoring. Tables 2A
and 2B show the elasticities derived from the regression results (see the Appendix for the
derivation of the elasticities).9 Table 2A shows the results from regressions with a measure
of overall oﬀshoring included and Table 2B shows the results from regressions with separate
measures of oﬀshoring to high-income and low-income countries, respectively. In Table 2A
we have included our measure of inhouse oﬀshoring as well, while this measure is absent
from Table 2B; the reason being that the two oﬀshoring measures become highly correlated
when we divide them into diﬀerent country groups.
[Table 2A-2C about here]
According to the results in Table 2A, overall oﬀshoring tends to shift labor demand
away from workers with upper secondary education. For a given level of output and capital,
a one percentage point increase in the oﬀshoring measure decreases demand for workers
with upper secondary education by 0.6 percent based on the regression assuming economy-
wide wages (the elasticity is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). The estimated elasticities
for the other skill groups are positive, but only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in the
regression with economy-wide wages for employees with tertiary education. The estimated
elasticities with respect to inhouse oﬀshoring are insigniﬁcant, with the exception for the
elasticity for workers with tertiary education in the speciﬁcation with economy-wide wages,
which is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. This estimate, however, indicates
a quantitatively small eﬀect; a one percentage point increase in foreign employment as a
share of parent employment (which may very well be above 100 percent) is associated with
an increase in the demand for workers with tertiary education with 0.01 percent.
We see a similar pattern for oﬀshoring to low-income countries in Table 2B; the es-
timated elasticities indicate a shift of demand away from workers with upper secondary
education. Here, the positive elasticities for workers with tertiary education are signiﬁcant,
indicating that this demand shift mainly beneﬁts workers in the highest skill group. A one
percentage point increase in the measure of oﬀs h o r i n gt ol o w - i n c o m ec o u n t r i e si se s t i m a t e d
regressions.
9The regression results may be obtained from the authors upon request.
13to reduce the demand for workers with secondary education by about 3.5 percent and in-
crease the demand for workers with tertiary education by 5-6 percent. The magnitude
of these elasticities may seem large, but it should be noted that a one percentage point
increase in oﬀs h o r i n gt ol o w - i n c o m ec o u n t r i e sw o u l d ,i nf a c t ,i m p l yad o u b l i n gf r o mt h e
present level.
It is useful to compare these elasticities with those obtained for R&D, our other measure
of factor-biased technological change. For a given level of output and capital, increases in
R&D quite clearly shift labor demand away from workers with lower secondary and upper
secondary education and towards workers with tertiary education. This is consistent with
results from Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Haskel and Heden (1999), Hansson (2005)
and Hijzen et al. (2005).
In Table 2C, we show results distinguishing between oﬀshoring to diﬀerent regions,
more precisely Western Europe (WE), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Asia (AS) and
North America (NA). We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant elasticity for workers with upper
secondary education and a positive and signiﬁcant elasticity for workers with tertiary
education with respect to oﬀshoring to Central and Eastern Europe. As is evident from
the table, there is a negative elasticity for workers with tertiary education with respect to
oﬀshoring to Asia. However, while the results for Central and Eastern Europe are robust
to alternative groupings of countries (see Table A1A in the appendix), the result for Asia
is not.10
To include region-speciﬁc measures of inhouse oﬀshoring in these regressions is diﬃcult,
since the measures of inhouse oﬀshoring are highly correlated with oﬀhoring. We have run
speciﬁcations where inhouse oﬀshoring divided into one region and the rest of the world
are included along with total oﬀshoring. In these speciﬁcations, only the estimates for
inhouse oﬀs h o r i n gt oA s i at u r no u ts i g n i ﬁcant, with positive signs for workers with upper
secondary education (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level) and negative signs for workers
10Since the correlation between diﬀerent oﬀshoring measures is relatively high, multicolinearity is a
concern here. We have dealt with this by running speciﬁcations where oﬀshoring has been divided into
oﬀshoring to one region and the rest of the world. In these speciﬁcations, the results shown in Table
A1A in the appendix are the only ones where the elasticities with respect to the region are signiﬁcant.
The elasticities for workers with tertiary education with respect to oﬀs h o r i n gt oA s i aa r es t a t i s t i c a l l y
insigniﬁcant. These results will be provided by the authors upon request.
14with lower secondary education (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, see Table A1B in the
appendix). The impact of the Swedish multinationals’ expansion into Asia thus seems to
be in line with what we might expect from an expansion into low-wage countries; a shift
of demand away from workers with the lowest level of education.
Tables 3A-3C show similar results based on the broad measure of oﬀshoring. Table
3A shows results for the overall measure of oﬀshoring, while 3B shows results for separate
measures of oﬀshoring to high and low income countries. As before, inhouse oﬀshoring
is included in Table 3A, but not in Table 3B. The results in these tables also reveal a
tendency for overall oﬀshoring and oﬀshoring to low-income countries to shift labor demand
away from workers with upper secondary education. Few of the elasticities are signiﬁcant
in Table 3A, but the elasticities of oﬀhshoring to low-income countries with respect to
workers with upper secondary education in Table 3B are negative and signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. In terms of magnitudes, a one percentage point increase in the broad
measure of oﬀshoring to low-income countries tends to decrease demand for workers with
upper secondary education by about 1.6-2.1 percent. Interestingly, according to Table
3B, oﬀshoring to low-income countries actually tends to increase demand for workers with
only lower secondary education. In Table 3A, inhouse oﬀshoring is estimated to increase
demand for workers with tertiary education, but as before the eﬀect is quantitatively very
small. In Table 3C, the estimated elasticities of oﬀshoring to Central and Eastern Europe
are now only signiﬁcant for workers with tertiary education (with positive signs). The
negative eﬀect on demand for workers with upper secondary education now seems to be
mainly picked up by oﬀshoring to North America. Once more, the negative elasticity
for workers with tertiary education with respect to oﬀs h o r i n gt oA s i ai sn o tr o b u s tt o
alternative groupings of countries.11
[Table 3A-3C about here]
Thus, the eﬀect on the composition of labor demand is estimated to be one where
demand is primarily shifted away from workers with intermediate education. The elasticity
11The results will be provided by the authors upon request.
15in terms of total oﬀshoring is close to that of Hijzen et al. (2005) for unskilled workers in
the UK.12 However, unlike in the analysis by Hijzen et al. (2005), we ﬁnd this eﬀect on
the demand for semi-skilled labor. The diﬀerence in results may partly be explained by
the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of skills; Hijzen et al. use occupations to deﬁne skill groups while
we use educational attainment. Many of the workers in plant and machine occupations,
deﬁned as unskilled by Hijzen et al., are likely to have upper secondary education in
Sweden. Falk and Koebel (2002), who also use educational attainment as a measure of
skill, ﬁnd no evidence that the lowest skill group can be substituted for imported materials
in Germany. At the same time, however, they ﬁnd complementarity between semi-skilled
w o r k e r sa n di m p o r t e dm a t e r i a l s—t h eo p p o s i t er e s u l tt oo u r s .
4.2 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of the these results, we use employment shares instead of cost
shares as dependent variables. This procedure is used to check robustness by Hijzen et
al. (2005) and in earlier studies with single equation relative factor demand (e.g. Machin
and Van Reenen 1998, Anderton and Brenton, 1999 and Strauss-Kahn, 2003). In countries
with rigid labour markets, employment shares may reveal more about the eﬀects of a shock
since wages do not adjust fully to clear the labor market. Instead, a shock to relative labor
demand will result in an increase in unemployment of the labor whose relative demand
falls. Moreover, there might be a simultaneity bias between labor costs shares and wages
that leads to upward biased estimates in cost share regressions (see e.g. Hijzen et al.,
2005).
Table A2A-A2C in the appendix report the main results using the narrow measure of
oﬀshoring and employment shares. We do not ﬁnd any important diﬀerences compared to
the results based on cost shares. In Table A2A, total oﬀshoring has no signiﬁcant impact
on relative labor demand, while inhouse oﬀshoring appears to have a positive but small
impact on the demand for labor with tertiary education. Results in Table A2B show
that oﬀshoring to low-income countries still has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on the
12The elasticity was -0.44 with respect to unskilled labor in the speciﬁcation with cost shares as depen-
dent variables and -0.36 in the speciﬁcation with employment shares for the 1982-1996 period.
16demand for labor with upper secondary education and positive and siginiﬁcant impact
on the demand for labor with tertiary education. Finally, Table A2C conﬁrms that these
eﬀe c t ss t e mm a i n l yf r o mo ﬀshoring to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). As before, the
results for Central and Eastern Europe are found to be robust to alternative groupings of
countries, whereas the results for Asia are not.13 Compared to the elasticities reported
in Tables 2A-2C, the elasticities in the employment regression tend to be smaller, which
suggests that the former estimates are biased upward because of simultaneity. Particularly,
this is the case for the elasticities for workers with upper secondary education.
Workers with higher education seem to be those beneﬁtting the most in terms of in-
creased relative demand from oﬀshoring to low-income countries within industries, while
workers with only lower secondary education seem to beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀshoring across all in-
dustries to low-income countries. The result that oﬀs h o r i n gt ol o w - i n c o m ec o u n t r i e st e n d s
to increase the relative demand for workers with lower secondary education is somewhat
surprising, considering that we would expect oﬀshoring to partly substitute for this type
of worker. The characteristics of the Swedish labor market might explain this result. As
seen in Figure 4, a large share of the Swedish labor force has upper secondary education.
However, older cohorts of workers are more likely to only have lower secondary education.
These older cohorts may be in a better position to keep their jobs, thanks to longer expe-
rience and the fact that Swedish labor market legislation provides job security based on
tenure.
To explore whether an age eﬀect is underlying the results presented in Tables 2-3,
we carry out a similar econometric analysis deﬁning the diﬀerent worker groups on basis
of age instead of education. We deﬁne three age groups; workers aged 25-39, 40-54 and
55-65. However, we do not ﬁnd any robust pattern in the results for the narrow and
broad measures of oﬀshoring. Thus, oﬀshoring does not seem to have any diﬀerential
impact on demand for workers in the three age groups. Arguably, categorizing workers
only according to age generates groups that are too heterogenous with respect to education
to properly disentangle a possible age eﬀect. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to
diﬀerentiate with respect to both age and education, so we cannot investigate this possible
13T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eo nr e q u e s t .
17interpretation of the results any further.
Since oﬀshoring to low-income countries has increased so much more in the electronic
industry than in the rest of the manufacturing sector we need to check whether the results
are entirely driven by this sector. We have therefore run regressions where we have allowed
the parameter λ2 to diﬀer between the electronic industry and the other industries. We
cannot reject the hypothesis that the parameters are the same.14
4.3 Quantifying the results
Our regression analysis for educational groups yields rather large elasticities, in particular
for oﬀshoring to low wage countries. However, as noted above, a one percentage point
increase in oﬀs h o r i n gt ol o w - i n c o m ec o u n t r i e sw o u l d ,i nf a c t ,i m p l yad o u b l i n gf r o mt h e
present level. To analyze the economic importance of the results, we use the elasticities
to calculate an estimate of the number of employees aﬀected by the change in oﬀshoring
between 1995 and 2000, which is evident from Table 1. We mainly focus on the negative
estimates for workers with upper secondary education, since this is the group for which
we get consistent and signiﬁcant elasticities across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. According
to our estimates, the actual change in total oﬀshoring in 1995-2000 was associated with
a reduction in the demand for workers with upper secondary education by 1866 (narrow
measure) to 3073 (broad measure) workers. The actual change in oﬀshoring to low-income
countries was associated with a reduction in the demand for workers with upper sec-
ondary education by 6678 (broad measure) to 6972 (narrow measure) workers (see Table
4). According to our calculations, this change was, at the same time, associated with an
increase in the demand for workers with tertiary education by 3801 workers. Whether
these eﬀects are large or small is diﬃcult to judge. Considering that the total number of
unemployed decreased by 129,700 between 1995 and 2000 — leaving 203,100 still registered
as unemployed in 2000 — we would argue that the ﬁgures are relatively small.15
14All of these results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
15Source: AKU statistics, Statistics Sweden.
18Table 5. Implied changes in demand for workers with upper secondary education of
actual increase in oﬀshoring 1995-2000
Estimated Change in Perc. change. Implied change
Measure elasticity oﬀshoring in demand in demand
All countries Narrow -0.629 0.007 -0.004 -1866
Broad -0.203 0.038 -0.012 -3073
Low-income Narrow -3.631 0.002 -0.009 -6972
countries Broad -2.126 0.004 -0.008 -6678
Note: Starting point is the number of workers with secondary eduction employed in the manufac-
turing industry in 1995 (396,480). Source: authors’ own calculations.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have used a cost function approach to estimate the eﬀect of oﬀshoring of
intermediate input production on the composition of labor demand. We ﬁnd that overall
oﬀshoring as well as oﬀshoring to low-wage economies tend to shift demand away for
workers with upper secondary education. This eﬀect is robust to controlling for oﬀshoring
of ﬁnal goods production. It contrasts with the estimated eﬀect of R&D investments, which
tend to shift demand away from workers with lower secondary education and towards
workers with tertiary education. On the other hand, we do not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of oﬀshoring to high-income countries. We interpret this as evidence
of oﬀshoring to high-income countries — which constitutes the main part of measured
oﬀshoring from Sweden — being related to a more general fragmentation of production,
rather than as a tendency for labor intensive activities to be re-located in response to
labor cost diﬀerentials.
A decomposition of oﬀs h o r i n gt od i ﬀerent geographical regions yields results suggesting
that the negative eﬀect on workers with upper secondary education is mainly driven by
oﬀshoring to Central and Eastern Europe. Our estimated elasticities are fairly large,
but they translate into rather small numbers of lost jobs to workes with upper secondary
education from actual oﬀshoring 1995—2000. It should be noted, however, that our analysis
does not take into account that oﬀshoring may have aﬀected growth of output and capital
accumulation; factors that in quantitative terms might be more important for employment
19growth than any substitution between domestic workers and imported inputs.
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21A Appendix: Data
The trade data along with input-output tables, price deﬂators and other industry-speciﬁc
variables have been provided by Statistics Sweden. Data on number of employees, wages
and educational attainment have been collected from the RAMS database (Regional Ar-
betsmarknadsstatistik). Information about employment of Swedish multinationals at the
industry level has been provided by the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS)
in Stockholm.
The basic industry classiﬁcation used is based on three-digit SNI92 (which corresponds
to three-digit NACE). There are some instances where three-digit industries have been
lumped together because of suppression of data at a more detailed level. All in all, we
have data on 89 diﬀerent manufacturing industries in most of the trade and industry
statistics. Information about capital stocks, however, is only available at a higher level
of aggregation — roughly at the two-digit level. Moreover, the input-output tables use an
industry classiﬁcation corresponding to two-digit NACE. Therefore, the analysis is carried
a broader industry classiﬁcation including 20 industries.
22Table 6. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost share of workers with
primary education 0.2777 0.1062 0.0782 0.4920
secondary education 0.4893 0.0517 0.3777 0.6080
tertiary education 0.2330 0.1277 0.0711 0.5441
Employment share of workers with
primary education 0.3069 0.0989 0.1121 0.5142
secondary education 0.5141 0.0431 0.4192 0.6167
tertiary education 0.1790 0.1023 0.0655 0.4346
Log of wages of workers with
primary education -1.7263 0.1739 -2.2064 -1.4381
secondary education -1.6504 0.2074 -2.3200 -1.3679
tertiary education -1.3259 0.2445 -2.1557 -1.0148
Log of capital stock 9.5764 1.1125 6.8865 11.3503
Log of value added 9.2908 1.2591 5.9231 10.8891
Log of R&D expenditure per gross output 0.04084 0.0478 0.0002 0.2753
Narrow oﬀshoring 0.0755 0.0558 0.0065 0.1999
Broad oﬀshoring 0.2275 0.1721 0.0466 0.7495
Inhouse oﬀshoring 1.3416 1.1496 0.0607 5.8750
Note: 120 observations.
B Appendix: Deriving elasticities
In this section, we shall show how the elasticities calculated in the paper are derived from
the translog cost function. The starting point is the following cost function for industry i:
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where the variables are as deﬁn e di nt h em a i nt e x t .B yd i ﬀerentiating (8) with respect to
23wj we get:
θij = αj +
S X
s=1




























Diﬀerentiation of expression (12) yields:












utilizing the equality in (11).
Substituting b Cj in (13) for
PS



























where k 6= j and a hat above a variable indicates relative change (i.e. b x ≡ dx/x). From















The technology variables, zir, are expressed as shares. Therefore, we will report the results







These will tell us the percentage response in labor demand to a one-percentage point
change in the technology variable. In our calculations, we evaluate these elasticities using
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Figure 4: Employment trends for diﬀerent educational groups in the manufacturing sector.
29Table 2A. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Narrow measure of 
offshoring 
      Changes in:           Inhouse         
Demand for    Value    Off-  Off-  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added R&D  shoring shoring lower sec.  upper sec. tertiary
Lower sec.   (1)  0.155 -0.072 -0.864  0.467  -0.005       
education    (0.075)** (0.046) (0.438)*  (0.342) (0.006)       
  (2)  0.161 -0.073 -0.784  0.421  -0.005 -0.531  0.236 0.295 
    (0.075)** (0.047) (0.424)*  (0.355)  (0.007) (0.503)  (0.516) (0.248)
                 
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.113 0.026  -0.095  -0.629  -0.004       
education    (0.068) (0.028) (0.185)  (0.374)* (0.008)      
  (2)  -0.123 0.035  -0.224  -0.463  -0.003 0.134  -0.014  -0.221 
    (0.066)* (0.026) (0.208)  (0.378)  (0.008) (0.293)  (0.282) (0.158)
                 
Tertiary  (1)  0.052 0.030  1.229  0.765 0.014       
education    (0.077) (0.049) (0.484)** (0.414)* (0.008)*      
  (2)  0.067 0.013  1.405  0.470  0.011 0.352  -0.252  -0.100 
      (0.067) (0.052) (0.487)*** (0.439)  (0.009) (0.281)  (0.314) (0.302)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas 
specification (2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on   




Table 2B. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Narrow measure of 
offshoring 
      Changes in:                      
Demand for      Value   Offshoring  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added R&D  HI  LI  lower sec.  upper sec. tertiary
Lower sec.   (1)  0.138 -0.069 -0.841  0.425  1.144       
education    (0.081)* (0.046) (0.439)*  (0.522) (2.095)      
  (2)  0.146 -0.072 -0.681  0.248  1.661 -0.320  0.035  0.284 
    (0.079)* (0.045) (0.400)*  (0.511) (2.360) (0.481)  (0.487)  (0.236)
                
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.102 0.039  -0.146  -0.046 -3.631       
education    (0.068) (0.030) (0.193)  (0.441) (1.570)**     
  (2)  -0.112 0.046  -0.308  0.095  -3.398 0.237  0.069  -0.190 
    (0.072) (0.029) (0.225)  (0.436) (1.752)* (0.276)  (0.259)  (0.156)
                
Tertiary  (1)  0.049 0.001  1.310  -0.410 6.263      
education    (0.082) (0.048) (0.477)*** (0.543) (2.239)***     
  (2)  0.062 -0.010 1.458  -0.494 5.157 0.339 -0.187  -0.152 
      (0.079) (0.051) (0.476)*** (0.528) (2.731)* (0.271)  (0.307)  (0.286)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas 
specification (2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on 
bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 2C. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Narrow measure of 
offshoring       
      Changes in:                            
Demand for      Value    Offshoring  Wages 





  Lower sec.   (1)  0.116          -0.064 -0.882  -0.348 -2.463 2.883 4.437
education    (0.080)             
             
             
               
               
           
               
             
              
                   
           
               






  (2)  0.125 -0.066 -0.747 -0.461 -1.464 2.857 4.282 -0.336 0.110 0.226
    (0.084) (0.046) (0.369)**
 
(0.580) (5.234) (2.690) (3.269) (0.505) (0.519) (0.250)
   
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.109 0.042 -0.054  -0.015 -7.708 -3.720 0.893





  (2)  -0.120 0.047 -0.192 0.030 -7.531 -3.296 1.250 0.062 -0.034 -0.129
    (0.065)* (0.026)* (0.213) (0.412) (3.191)**
 
(2.444) (1.747) (0.294) (0.262) (0.138)
   
Tertiary  (1)  0.091 -0.011 1.164 0.447 19.126 4.376 -7.165





  (2)  0.103 -0.021 1.293 0.488 17.563 3.519 -7.729 0.270 -0.060 -0.209
      (0.080) (0.052) (0.403)*** (0.622) (5.210)*** (3.3737) (2.927)***  (0.282) (0.312) (0.288)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas specification (2) includes  
industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent  
level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.                
 
31 Table 3A. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Broad measure of offshoring 
      Changes in:           Inhouse          
Demand for    Value    Off-  Off-  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added  R&D  shoring shoring  lower sec.  upper sec.  tertiary
Lower sec.   (1)  0.164  -0.079  -0.832 0.142 -0.006       
education    (0.075)** (0.046)* (0.423)**  (0.182) (0.006)       
  (2)  0.166 -0.079  -0.680  0.163  -0.005 -0.337  0.025 0.312 
    (0.079)** (0.046)* (0.400)*  (0.195) (0.007) (0.480)  (0.496)  (0.239)
                
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.123  0.036 -0.140 -0.203 -0.003       
education    (0.064)* (0.029)  (0.183)  (0.165) (0.008)       
  (2)  -0.126 0.042  -0.305  -0.191  -0.003 0.014  0.111  -0.125 
    (0.062)** (0.027)  (0.212)  (0.158)  (0.008) (0.281)  (0.270)  (0.152)
                
Tertiary  (1)  0.062 0.019  1.285  0.258 0.013       
education    (0.075) (0.048)  (0.471)*** (0.231) (0.008)*       
  (2)  0.067  0.006 1.451 0.207 0.011 0.372  -0.263  -0.109 
      (0.094) (0.031)  (0.258)*** (0.109)* (0.001)*** (0.229) (0.419)  (0.175)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas specification  
(2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on bootstrapping. Significance at  
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.        
 
 
Table 3B. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Broad measure of 
offshoring 
      Changes in:                      
Demand for    Value    Offshoring  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added  R&D  HI  LI  lower sec.  upper sec.  tertiary
Lower sec.   (1)  0.122 -0.083  -0.785  -0.119 2.079       
education    (0.082) (0.045)* (0.439)* (0.247) (1.121)*      
  (2)  0.126 -0.082  -0.595  -0.117 2.379 -0.156  -0.042  0.199 
    (0.076)* (0.044)* (0.338)*  (0.249) (1.227)* (0.433) (0.466)  (0.253)
                  
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.101 0.046  -0.161  0.083  -2.126       
education    (0.074) (0.032) (0.206)  (0.156) (0.810)**     
  (2)  -0.112 0.048  -0.319  0.015  -1.621 -0.024  0.090 -0.066 
    (0.074) (0.030) (0.218)  (0.160) (0.908)* (0.267) (0.255)  (0.166)
                  
Tertiary  (1)  0.067 0.002  1.273  -0.032 1.989      
education    (0.084) (0.048) (0.481)*** (0.243) (1.229)      
  (2)  0.085 -0.004  1.379  0.109  0.568 0.237  -0.138  -0.099 
      (0.080)  (0.050) (0.420)*** (0.243) (1.441) (0.236) (0.289)  (0.307)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas 
specification (2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on 
bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 3C. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Broad measure of offshoring   
      Changes in:                            
Demand for    Value    Offshoring  Wages 





  Lower sec.   (1)  0.106              -0.075 -0.795 -0.618 -1.233 0.412 4.088
education    (0.075)         
                 
             
               
                   
                 
                 
                 
                 
                   
     
                 
         
(0.045)*  (0.399)**
 
(0.299)** (3.510) (2.835) (1.657)**
  (2)  0.111 -0.075 -0.652 -0.593 -0.444 0.460 3.947 -0.273 0.094 0.179
    (0.076)* (0.044)*  (0.381)* (0.363) (3.952) (3.121) (1.888)**
 
(0.473) (0.499) (0.251)
   
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.103 0.049 -0.101 0.315 -3.803 -2.320 -0.847
education    (0.062)* (0.030)* (0.200) (0.274) (2.774) (1.361)*
 
(1.230)
  (2)  -0.113 0.051 -0.234 0.189 -3.537 -2.125 -0.361 0.054 -0.020 -0.033
    (0.069)* (0.028)* (0.219) (0.280) (2.828) (1.244)* (1.291) (0.283) (0.271) (0.163)
   
Tertiary  (1)  0.090 -0.013 1.161 0.077 9.458 4.383 -3.094
education    (0.076) (0.048)  (0.424)***
 
(0.322) (3.631)*** (2.692)* (1.606)*    
  (2)  0.105 -0.019 1.269 0.308 7.958 3.915 -3.947 0.213 -0.070 -0.143
      (0.076) (0.048)  (0.432)*** (0.338) (4.033)** (2.931) (1.741)** (0.267) (0.314) (0.305)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas specification (2) includes  
industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent  
level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.               
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Table A1A. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Narrow measure of 
offshoring 
      Changes in:                      
Demand for      Value    Offshoring  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added  R&D  Other CEE  lower sec.  upper sec. tertiary
Lower sec.   (1)  0.145  -0.066  -0.860 0.586 -0.379       
education    (0.080)* (0.046)  (0.431)** (0.420) (3.495)      
  (2)  0.153 -0.069  -0.734  0.480  0.156 -0.413  0.109  0.304 
    (0.080)* (0.045)  (0.363)** (0.424) (3.960) (0.471)  (0.480)  (0.231)
                 
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.109 0.038  -0.130  -0.183 -6.948       
education    (0.067)*** (0.030)** (0.200) (0.366) (2.789)***      
  (2)  -0.119 0.044  -0.275  -0.057 -6.459 0.062  0.024  -0.186
    (0.071)* (0.029)  (0.210)  (0.363) (3.084)** (0.272) (0.261)  (0.158)
                 
Tertiary  (1)  0.057 0.000  1.297  -0.315 15.046      
education    (0.084) (0.046)  (0.468)*** (0.454) (3.781)***     
  (2)  0.067 -0.011  1.453  -0.453 13.380 0.363  -0.179  -0.184
      (0.077) (0.051)  (0.445)*** (0.469) (4.495)*** (0.264) (0.303)  (0.273)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas  
specification (2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on bootstrapping. 
Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.      
 
 
Table A1B. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions. Narrow measure of offshoring 
      Changes in:                         
Demand for      Value    Off-  Inhouse Offshoring  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added R&D  shoring Other  ASIA  lower sec. upper sec. tertiary
Lower sec.   (1)  0.168 -0.070 -0.904  0.553 0.003 -0.159       
education    (0.072)** (0.047) (0.419)**  (0.360) (0.006) (0.092)*       
  (2)  0.172 -0.071 -0.851  0.514  0.002 -0.156  -0.610  0.316  0.293 
    (0.074)** (0.048) (0.377)**  (0.376)  (0.007) (0.093)*  (0.475) (0.491)  (0.233)
                   
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.120 0.025  -0.073  -0.671 -0.008  0.077       
education    (0.066)* (0.028) (0.193)  (0.384)* (0.009) (0.060)       
  (2)  -0.129 0.034  -0.189  -0.505  -0.006 0.071  0.180  -0.059  -0.121 
    (0.064)** (0.027) (0.199) (0.391)  (0.009) (0.061)  (0.279) (0.271)  (0.167)
                   
Tertiary  (1)  0.078 0.024  1.180  0.783  0.020 0.068       
education    (0.084) (0.048) (0.472)**  (0.467)* (0.017) (0.089)       
  (2)  0.066 0.012  1.410  0.450 0.010  0.037  0.350  -0.254 -0.096 
      (0.077) (0.054) (0.460)*** (0.476)  (0.012) (0.097)  (0.263) (0.312)  (0.291)
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas specification (2)  
includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5,  
and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.            
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Table A2A. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions with employment shares 
Narrow measure of offshoring             
      Changes in:           Inhouse         
Demand for      Value    Off-  Off-  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added R&D  shoring shoring lower sec.  upper sec.  tertiary 
Lower sec.   (1)  0.111 -0.066  -0.588  0.298  -0.003       
education    (0.067)* (0.043) (0.409)  (0.326) (0.006)      
  (2)  0.108 -0.071  -0.659  0.252  -0.004 -1.019  0.655  0.364 
    (0.068) (0.045) (0.405)  (0.345) (0.006) (0.401)**  (0.433)  (0.219) 
                 
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.108 0.035  -0.177  -0.414  -0.003       
education    (0.054)** (0.022) (0.140)  (0.304) (0.007)      
  (2)  -0.109 0.039  -0.182  -0.357  -0.002 0.391  -0.418  0.027 
    (0.056)* (0.022)* (0.162)  (0.322) (0.007) (0.258)  (0.257)  (0.113) 
                 
Tertiary   (1)  0.120 0.013  1.518  0.678 0.013       
education    (0.064)* (0.043) (0.429)*** (0.411) (0.008)*      
  (2)  0.130 0.010  1.654  0.593  0.013 0.624  0.077 -0.701 
      (0.066)* (0.047) (0.437)*** (0.441) (0.008)* (0.220)*** (0.228)  (0.235)***
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas 
specification (2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on 
bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
 
Table A2B. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions with employment shares 
Narrow measure of offshoring             
      Changes in:                      
Demand for      Value    Offshoring  Wages 
labor with:  Spec.  Capital   added  R&D  HI  LI  lower sec.  upper sec.  tertiary 
Lower sec.   (1)  0.099 -0.065  -0.569  0.222  0.984       
education    (0.073) (0.043)  (0.382) (0.451) (2.234)       
  (2)  0.099 -0.067  -0.603  0.288  0.310 -0.889  0.518  0.371 
    (0.073) (0.043)  (0.384)  (0.469) (2.397) (0.419)  (0.417)  (0.214) 
                
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.099 0.045  -0.218  0.042  -2.780       
education    (0.057)* (0.023)* (0.154)  (0.348) (1.295)**     
  (2)  -0.101 0.047  -0.244  0.053  -2.525 0.309  -0.359  0.050 
    (0.060)* (0.023)** (0.173)  (0.364) (1.426)* (0.249) (0.236)  (0.123) 
                
Tertiary   (1)  0.113 -0.016  1.603  -0.502 6.299       
education    (0.067)* (0.044)  (0.403)*** (0.490) (2.471)**     
  (2)  0.120 -0.019  1.734  -0.646 6.724 0.636  0.144 -0.780 
      (0.069)* (0.045)  (0.424)*** (0.496) (2.775)** (0.238)*** (0.240)  (0.232)***
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas 
specification (2) includes industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on 
bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table A2C. Elasticities calculated from estimations of translog cost functions with employment shares 
          
  
   Narrow measure of offshoring 
      Changes in:                            
Demand for      Value    Offshoring  Wages 





  Lower sec.   (1)  0.081          -0.060 -0.611  -0.439 -2.550 2.569 3.812
education    (0.072)             
               
             
               
               
         
           
           
               
                 
        
                 
     
(0.042) (0.378)  (0.530)
 
(4.973) (2.607) (2.964)
  (2)  0.079 -0.062 -0.648 -0.370 -3.473 2.363 3.748 -0.897 0.571 0.326
    (0.072)* (0.043) (0.352)*  (0.550) (4.867) (2.657) (2.844) (0.457)* (0.459) (0.217)
   
Upper sec.  (1)  -0.103 0.046 -0.146  0.118 -5.174 -2.820 0.250






(1.453)   
  (2)  -0.104 0.047 -0.153 0.103 -4.871 -2.702 0.316 0.341 -0.441 0.100
    (0.058)* (0.021)** (0.166) (0.350) (2.788)* (1.958) (1.481)  (0.274) (0.259)* (0.120)
   
Tertiary   (1)  0.157 -0.028 1.468 0.414  19.237 3.696 -7.255
education    (0.070)** (0.042)  (0.391)***
 
(0.559) (4.770)*** (3.721) (2.514)***
  (2)  0.162 -0.028 1.551 0.338 19.948 3.712 -7.334 0.559 0.288 -0.847
      (0.067)** (0.046)  (0.380)*** (0.585) (5.129)*** (3.463) (2.507)***  (0.248)** (0.253) (0.226)***
Note: Specification (1) is without wages on the assumption that wages are set economy-wide, whereas specification (2) includes  
industry-distributed wages. Standard errors in parenthesis are based on bootstrapping. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent  
level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.                
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